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Abstract
We build on Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) and Keane (2010) and show
that in order to fulll the Instrumental variable (IV) identifying moment
condition, a policy must be designed so that compliers and non-compliers
either have the same average error term, or have an error term ratio equal to
their relative share of the population. The former condition (labeled Choice
Orthogonality) is essentially a no-selection condition. The latter one, referred
to as Weighted Opposite Choices, may be viewed as a distributional (func-
tional form) assumption necessary to match the degree of selectivity between
compliers and noncompliers to their relative population proportions. Those
conditions form a core of implicit IV assumptions that are present in any
empirical applications. They allow the econometrician to gain substantial
insight about the validity of a specic instrument, and they illustrate the
link between identication and the statistical strength of an instrument. Fi-
nally, our characterization may also help designing a policy generating a valid
instrument.
Key Words: Instrumental Variable methods, Implicit Assumptions,
Treatment Eects.
JEL Classication: B4, C1, C3.
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1 Introductory Remarks
The analysis presented in this paper discloses a relationship between IV es-
timation and sample selection models that goes deeper than the role of the
rst-stage model within the comparative advantages (LATE) approach (Vyt-
lacil, 2002, Imbens and Angrist, 1994, Heckman and Vytlacil , 2005). We
build on ideas exposed in Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) and Keane (2010)
and show that the IV identifying moment condition, usually expressed as
a treatment-control orthogonality condition, may be re-interpreted as two
mutually exclusive sample selection conditions that jointly restrict (i) dier-
ences in error terms between those aected (compliers) and those unaected
(non-compliers), (ii) and their relative shares (the noncomplying odds ratio).
To fulll the moment condition, a policy must be designed so that com-
pliers and non-compliers either have the same average error term, or have an
error term ratio equal to their relative share of the population. The former
condition, which we label Choice Orthogonality, is essentially a no-selection
condition. The latter one, which we refer to as Weighted Opposite Choices,
may be viewed as a distributional (functional form) assumption necessary to
match the degree of selectivity between compliers and non-compliers to their
relative population proportions.
Our characterization is valid for virtually all micro-econometric applica-
tions of IV found in the empirical literature, as long as a strictly positive
fraction of individuals remain unaected by a policy, and as long as the
parameter of interest is identied by a moment (orthogonality) condition.1
It is valid in the classical case where the error term of the outcome equa-
tion is additive as well as in a comparative advantages framework, or in the
LATE framework. Unlike Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) and Keane (2010),
our approach does not require to rely on a tightly specied data generating
process. All is needed is an outcome equation. Nevertheless, those condi-
tions form a core of implicit IV assumptions that are present in any empirical
applications. They are valid in the classical linear IV framework, as well as
in any multiplicative error term framework (such as the correlated random
coecient model).
Our result is constructive. Transforming the treatment-control orthogo-
1Although this condition may sound innocuous, anecdotal evidence suggests that many
empiricists using IV methods disregards identication and do not distinguish between
estimators and estimands.
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nality condition into sample selection conditions, allows the econometrician
to gain substantial insight about the validity of a specic instrument, and
may also help design a policy intervention that generates a valid instrument.
Essentially, any econometrician who has some priors about the identity of
those aected by a policy and their relative shares of the total population,
can use our characterization of the implicit IV assumptions to evaluate the
likelihood that the identication condition be fullled. Finally, our result
sheds light on the relationship between the statistical strength of an instru-
ment (the weak-strong instrument paradigm), and its capacity to achieve
identication.
In the next section, we briey review some recent literatures on IV esti-
mation so to clarify the specicities of our analysis. Section 3 contains the
main core of the paper, and is devoted to the re-expression of the IV iden-
tifying assumption. In the following section, we introduce the distinction
between Dictatorial and Incentive-Based Policy Interventions. In Section 5,
we discuss a few related practical issues and discuss the extension of the
outcome equation to more general forms. The conclusion is found in Section
6.
2 Background Material
In the recent econometric literature, two distinct types of implicit IV assump-
tions have been analyzed. First, Heckman (1997), Vytlacil (2002), Heckman
and Vytlacil (2005), and Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil (2007) have analyzed
potential misspecications of the rst stage model of an IV regression within
a correlated random coecient model framework (Imbens and Angrist, 1994).
As is well illustrated in Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil (2007), and unlike for a
classical common slope IV regression, the rst stage regression model chosen
by the econometrician hides some crucial implicit behavioral assumptions.
When those assumptions are unfounded, the \Monotonicity" property may
be violated, and IV may produce uninterpretable results.2 These ndings
have also generated a substantial number of papers that debate the rele-
2This is naturally explained by the fact that dierent instruments may generate dif-
ferent population treatment eects. For instance, mis-specication may culminate in pa-
rameter estimates of opposite signs of their population counterparts (see Heckman and
Vytlacil, 2005).
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vance of estimating Local Average Treatment eects.3
In parallel, many economists have pointed out the behavioral implica-
tions underlying the IV identifying orthogonality condition. This constitutes
the second type of implicit assumptions that have been considered in the
literature, and is the focus of our paper.4
In an important contribution, Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) have ex-
amined a wide sets of microeconomic models (in Labor and Development),
and provided a \case by case" analysis of the implicit assumptions required
for interpreting IV estimates reported in the existing literature. In order
to develop their argumentation, Rosenzweig and Wolpin analyze specic ex-
amples in which the econometrician's error term is decomposed into model
specic components, and show how implementing policy changes is generally
not sucient to generate orthogonality conditions. This line of reasoning has
also been followed by Keane (2010).5
To be clear, the objective of our paper is to build on Rosenzweig and
Wolpin (2000) and Keane (2010) and show how their results can also be cast
within standard sample selection arguments, without relying on specic data
generating processes. For this reason, our approach also displays similarities
with the literature on IV estimation of the correlated random coecient
regression model and the LATE approach. However, it should be clear that
our analysis is for any IV identifying conditions and is therefore not conned
to models where outcome equations are subject to comparative advantages
or heterogenous treatment eects.
3See Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil (2005) and Imbens (2009) for opposite views about
the relevance of the LATE parameter.
4The identifying moment condition that we analyze in this paper, is actually called
the \Independence" assumption in Imbens and Angrist (1994) and Heckman and Vytlacil
(2005).
5Keane (2010) uses the term \atheoretical" approach to economics to refer to the
empirical literature using IV methods. Belzil (2007) uses similar arguments in his survey
of the structural literature on returns to schooling.
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3 Re-interpreting the IV Identifying Condi-
tion
Our main contribution is to produce a general characterization of the IV
identifying assumption that is portable across any empirical application. We
show that, as long as a strictly positive fraction of the population is not
aected by an intervention, substantial insight may be gained by introducing
the complying status into the identifying condition. There are at least four
good reasons to do it.
First, most realistic policy interventions set in a context where individ-
uals choose among a discrete set of options, can only aect a subset of the
population.
Second, most policies used in empirical work imply a non-trivial degree
of selectivity between compliers and non-compliers.6
Thirdly, in the applied treatment eect literature, the most favored in-
terpretation of IV estimates (the LATE parameter) is itself explicitly based
on the complying status.7 So, there is no logical reason why the identifying
moment condition would not take into account distinctions between those
aected and those who are not.
Finally, the fourth reason is that economists implementing an IV approach
are bound to have priors about the identity of those aected and unaected,
and possibly about their relative shares of the total population. They are
also bound to have some idea (precise or imprecise) about what unobserved
choices could contaminate the identifying assumption.
3.1 The Outcome Equation
We consider an econometrician who wants to estimate the eect of a right-
hand side endogenous variable, denoted S, on a left-hand side variable Y:
Assumption 1- The Outcome Equation
We assume that the true model is given by the following expression:
6This is the case, for instance, in the schooling literature where policies such as com-
pulsory schooling regulation changes are often used as instrument.
7For instance, the LATE interpretation of IV requires a positive proportion of individ-
uals who are not aected by a given policy change.
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Yi =  +   Si +  Wi (1)
where both S and W are endogenous variables,  is the parameter of interest,
and  is the intercept term.
We use the common slope version of the wage equation so to eliminate
ambiguity regarding which treatment eect should (or could) be targeted.
All the analysis presented below would carry through even if individuals
were endowed with their own : All is required is that , be identied by a
moment condition.
Assumption 2- Model Misspecication
To motivate our approach, we assume that the econometrician does not
observe Wi, and must therefore work with a mis-specied (or incompletely
specied) model.8 When estimating the model, the econometrician assumes
that
Yi =  +   Si + "i (2)
where "i is actually equal to  Wi and is the econometrician's error term:
At this stage, we do not give a precise set up of the model that generates
S and W: For instance, S and W may be chosen simultaneously, or sequen-
tially. All we assume is that both S and W are endogenous choice variables.
Throughout the paper, we refer to them as consumption levels, and assume
that they are driven by a common unobserved (to the econometrician) com-
ponent, i; with distribution function H(:): In this framework, we think of i
as the individual specic model primitives (tastes, preferences,.etc.).
This framework ts a large number of empirical applications considered in
Labor Economics, Health Economics, Public Economics, Crime Economics,
or other areas of applied microeconomics. For instance, in the human capital
literature, one may be interested in estimating the eect of education (S) on
earnings (Y) in a context where post-schooling skills (W) are unobserved. In
Health economics, the eect of pollution exposure (S) on birth weight (Y)
may be investigated in a context where the econometrician does not observe
alcohol (or drug) consumption of the pregnant woman (W).
8This is easily motivated by the common belief that all empirical models are (to some
extent) misspecied, and likely to omit the eect of unobserved individual choices.
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3.2 The Instrument
As a starting point, assume that the econometrician wants to estimate  by
IV methods. The instrument, Z; is a binary indicator such that Zi = 1 for
treatment, Zi = 0 for control, and which records an unanticipated policy
change. Without loss of generality, we assume that the econometrician has
access to a single instrument.
Assumption 3- Ex-Ante Randomization
As do all empirical economists using IV methods, we only consider policy
interventions that are subject to Ex-Ante Randomization. That is the distri-
bution of individual xed endowments (the model primitives) is invariant to
policy exposure. Formally, we have that
H(i j Zi = 1) = H(i j Z = 0) (3)
Using standard notation, the IV estimator is dened as
IV = (
X
i
ZiSi)
 1 XZiYi (4)
To be consistent with the empirical literature, we assume away any general
equilibrium eects.
We now introduce a random variable, Ci; which records the complying
status. Precisely, we have
Ci = 1 if Si(Zi = 1) 6= Si(Zi = 0) (Compliers)
Ci = 0 if Si(Zi = 1) = Si(Zi = 0) (Non-compliers)
Assumption 4- Strictly Positive Non-Complying Probability
We only consider policy interventions that leave a strictly positive fraction
of the treatment population unaected. That is, we assume that Pr(Zi =
1; Ci = 0) > 0:
To simplify notation, we denote Pr(Zi = 1; Ci = 0) by 	0(Zi = 1); and
Pr(Zi = 1; Ci = 1) by 	1(Zi = 1); and denote the ratio of those probabilities
by 	0;1(Zi = 1): That is
Pr(Zi = 1; Ci = 0)
Pr(Zi = 1; Ci = 1)
 	0(Zi = 1)
	1(Zi = 1)
 	0;1(Zi = 1) (5)
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The term, 	0;1(Zi = 1); which we call the Noncomplying Odds Ratio, is
the large sample equivalent of the observed relative shares of compliers and
non-compliers in the data.9
3.3 Characterizing the Implicit Assumptions
Because the treatment-control indicator is binary (0,1), identication of the
parameter of interest, ; requires that for each observation i;
E(Zi"i) = Pr(Zi = 1)  E("i j Zi = 1) = 0 (6)
Because the treatment group is composed of both compliers (for whom
Ci = 1), and noncompliers (for whom Ci = 0); (5) may be decomposed
further. That is
E(Zi"i) = Pr(Zi = 1)  E("i j Zi = 1)
= 	1(Zi = 1)  E("i j Zi = 1; Ci = 1) + 	0(Zi = 1)  E("i j Zi = 1; Ci = 0)
= 0 (7)
We now show that from a purely economic standpoint, it is informative
to decompose (7) into two mutually exclusive conditions.
3.3.1 Case 1: Choice Orthogonality (with Respect to Complying Status)
Choice Orthogonality arises when those aected and those unaected share
(on average) the same ": This is the case when
E("i j Zi = 1; Ci = 1) = E("i j Zi = 1; Ci = 0) = 0 (8)
Note that when Choice Orthogonality is fullled, neither Pr(Zi = 1; Ci =
1) nor Pr(Zi = 1; Ci = 0) play any role in the moment condition. So, as long
as the condition is fullled, the Noncomplying Odds Ratio is irrelevant. In
9In a more general model in which agents are subject to stochastic shocks, the comply-
ing status is a probabilistic event from the perspective of the agent (conditional on type).
Within our framework, it is sucient for the complying status to be stochastic from the
perspective of the econometrician.
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words, Choice Orthogonality implies that a policy, which initially randomizes
a population into treatment and control and aects a subset of the treatment
population only, must also reproduce another form of randomization by split-
ting the population into two groups (compliers and non-compliers) that have
the same average post-intervention choices (error term).
Now, consider the existence of a policy intervention which separates the
population into two groups that have an identical heterogeneity distribution.
If so, we say that Post-Treatment Identity Randomization is fullled. That
is the case when
H1(:) = H0(:) (9)
As should be clear, Post-Treatment Identity Randomization is a notion
that characterizes the set of individuals aected by a policy through policy
invariant components of the model (individual heterogeneity) as opposed
to choices.10 In our simple framework in which W (or ") depends on 
only (and not on Ci) , Post-Treatment Identity Randomization is a sucient
condition to generate Choice Orthogonality. This is not the case in more
general models.11
3.3.2 Case 2: Weighted Opposite Choices (with Respect to Complying
Status)
Obviously, Choice Orthogonality is not a necessary condition for the real-
ization of the identifying condition. Dierences between those aected and
unaected may be consistent with the fulllment of the orthogonality condi-
tion. This leads us to the second case.
A policy is characterized by Weighted Opposite Choices when
E("i j Zi = 1; Ci = 1) 6= 0
E("i j Zi = 1; Ci = 0) 6= 0
and when
10In practice, very few policy interventions are likely to generate Post-Treatment Identity
Randomization.
11It should also be clear that neither Post-Treatment Identity Randomization, nor Choice
Orthogonality are implied by Ex-Ante Randomization.
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E("i j Zi = 1; Ci = 1)
E("i j Zi = 1; Ci = 0) =  	0;1(Zi = 1) (10)
In words, (10) implies that behavioral dierences between compliers and
non-compliers are conditioned by the Noncomplying Odds Ratio 	0;1(Zi = 1).
From now on, we refer to E("ijZi=1;Ci=1)
E("ijZi=1;Ci=0) as the Error Term Ratio. Weighted
Opposite Choices implies that no matter what policy is considered, the Er-
ror Term Ratio is exactly equal to the relative shares of non-compliers and
compliers in the treatment group.
As an example, a policy that aects only 10% of the population, leading
to a Noncomplying Odds Ratio equal to 9, fullls this condition only if those
aected consume a quantity of good W which is 9 times the consumption of
those unaected.12 A policy aecting 2% would require a consumption ratio
equal to 49.
Policies that aect a more balanced subset of the population (those for
which the odds ratio approaches 1) do not require such extreme dierences
in the Error Term Ratio, but are still restricted. For instance, a policy
aecting 50% of the population fullls Weighted Opposite Choices if average
consumption of those aected is exactly equal to the opposite of the average
consumption of those unaected (E("i j Zi = 1; Ci = 1 =  E("i j Zi =
1; Ci = 0)).
There is however an important asymmetry between the Error Term Ratio
and the Noncomplying Odds Ratio. While the former is informative about
individual choices, the latter is an irrelevant quantity from the perspective of
the agent. That is, in absence of general equilibrium eect, agents' choices
would not react to any counterfactual manipulation of the Noncomplying
Odds Ratio, unless their own  has changed.13 For instance, an agent i
(endowed with i), would exercise the same choice even if the cross-section
distribution of  is manipulated externally.
12In empirical work, and to our knowledge, empiricists never argue in favor of orthogo-
nality conditions along those lines.
13It is also important to note that either Choice Orthogonality or Weighted Opposite
Choices may be fullled even if individuals are not randomized ex-ante (with respect to
individual specic heterogeneity). However, such policy interventions are practically never
considered in the applied literature.
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3.4 The IV Identifying Condition as Sample Selection
Conditions
The analysis presented in this section discloses an interesting paradox. The
current popularity of the IV approach is largely due to the willingness to
depart from the parametric selection models of the 1980's.14 Yet, the IV
identifying condition relies on the prime objects of the literature on selection
models, and the analogy between either Choice Orthogonality or Weighted
Opposite Choices and classical sample selection models is striking.
Essentially, Choice Orthogonality is realized when there is no selection
with respect to complying status. Indeed, both E("i j Zi = 1; Ci = 1) and
E("i j Zi = 1; Ci = 0) are incidentally truncated means which play a central
part in the selection literature (Heckman, 1979).
When it is impossible to maintain Choice Orthogonality, the econome-
trician must assume Weighted Opposite Choices. By doing so, the econo-
metrician restricts the shape of the distribution of " so to obtain a ratio of
truncated mean error terms equal to the Noncomplying Odds Ratio. Put
dierently, the degree of selectivity tolerated by the IV moment condition
imposes strong assumptions on the distribution of the error term.15 So, in
either case, the IV identifying condition boils down to a selection condition.
It is important to put our nding in perspectives with those papers that
have already noted the key role that selection models play in interpreting
IV estimates. In a seminal piece, Vytlacil (2002) has established that the
LATE approach to IV estimation (Imbens and Angrist, 1994) is equivalent
to a non-parametric selection model.16 Our nding is dierent. It shows that
the link between IV estimation and selection models goes much beyond the
14The author interested in the evolution of the microeconometric literature over the last
40 years should consult Heckman (2010).
15The issue is analogous to the characterization of the truncated means of a scalar
random variable X with mean . To see this, note that
 = E(X j X < c)  Pr(X < c) +
E(X j X  c)  Pr(X  c)
and that any restriction on  automatically implies restrictions on the truncated means
and the masses above and below a given truncation point c:
16To establish this result, Vytlacil needed to assumed independence (as do Imbens and
Angrist, 1994, and Heckman and Vytlacil, 2005).
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sole correlated random coecient regression model. As noted earlier, the in-
terpretation of the moment condition as sample selection conditions arise in
the most standard framework, in which the error term of the outcome equa-
tion is additive, although it is obviously valid in a comparative advantages
framework.17
4 The Distinction between Dictatorial and
Incentive-Based Policy Interventions
Until now, the notion of policy intervention has remained vague. We now
go a step further and link our theoretical results, to the qualitative nature
of a policy intervention. It is informative to separate policy interventions
into two distinct groups; namely Incentive-Based Policy Interventions and
Dictatorial Interventions.
4.1 Incentive-Based Policy Interventions
We dene Incentive-Based Policy Interventions as those that changes the
incentive to consume a specic good, by modifying some parameters. For
instance, a policy may oer a monetary incentive (or a disincentive) con-
ditional on consuming a particular quantity of good S. In the schooling
literature, any policy increasing the net utility of attending school (tuition
subsidies, transportation subsidies, building new universities) would fall into
this category.
4.2 Dictatorial Interventions
A Dictatorial Intervention aects individual decisions by restricting the choice
set. Formally, it imposes a minimum consumption level, smin , or a maxi-
mum, smax. Compulsory schooling regulations often used in the schooling
literature belongs to the class of dictatorial interventions.
17Finally, it should be reminded that those conditions have been derived under the
assumption that there is a non-empty set of non-compliers. Obviously, in a case where
the entire population is aected (that is when 	0(Zi = 1) = 0), we recover the usual
treatment-control orthogonality condition, namely E("i j Zi = 1) = 0:
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The distinction between Incentive-Based Policy Interventions and Dic-
tatorial Interventions is not innocuous. With dictatorial experiments, it is
possible to write the identifying condition as an expression that contains ex-
plicitly the mandatory consumption level itself. It is also interesting to note
that the Noncomplying Odds Ratio of a dictatorial policy may be inferred
directly from pre-intervention consumption.
For a minimum consumption policy, Choice Orthogonality entails
E("i j Zi = 1; Ci = 1) =
E("i j S(Zi = 0) < smin)) =
E("i j Zi = 1; Ci = 0) =
E("i j S(Zi = 0)  smin)) = 0 (11)
while Weighted Opposite Choice implies
E("i j S(Zi = 0) < smin))
E("i j S(Zi = 0)  smin)) =  
PrS(Zi = 0)  smin
PrS(Zi = 0) < smin
=  	0;1 (12)
In appendix, we provide two simple illustrations (one incentive-based policy
and one dictatorial intervention) using a bivariate normal distribution.
5 Practical Implications
5.1 Policy Design and Instrument Selection
For expositional purposes, assume that an econometrician is allowed to de-
sign his/her own policy so to generate a specic instrument.18 If so, our
characterization provides substantial information. For instance, suppose the
econometrician is allowed to choose the minimum consumption level. The
relevant odd's ratio being inferred from examining the ex-ante consumption
18Although this may sound awkward, designing the optimal policy for identication
purpouses is not much dierent from experimental protocoles used in Experimental Eco-
nomics to identify some deep structural (preference) parameters. In the case where a
specic parameter raises much interest, say the return to schooling, there is no reason to
believe that such an exercise would not be warranted.
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distribution, designing a policy requires to span all possible (realistic) values
of smin; and evaluate at which level the choice ratio is likely to match the
odds ratio.
In the applied literature, an econometrician is sometimes faced with the
possibility to choose among a limited set of instruments. Given some priors
about the identity of those aected by a policy and the Noncomplying Odds
Ratio, the econometrician can rely on our characterization to evaluate the
reliability of an instrument. In some cases, institutional features or com-
mon sense may rule out an extremely high (or low) choice ratio. If so, an
instrument may simply be ruled out because of its associated odds ratio.
For instance, an econometrician estimating the return to schooling can use
prior information about the degree of compression of the earnings distribution
in a particular country, and may decide to rule-out a specic instrument that
would require an unrealistic post-schooling earnings skill accumulation ratio.
In the Health Economics example mentioned in Section 3 (in which one
is interested in estimating the eect of pollution exposure on birth weight),
suppose the econometrician considers using an instrument generated by a
policy aecting a sub-population of pregnant women mostly coming from
disadvantaged background. Such an instrument could be ruled out if iden-
tication requires an unrealistically high average alcohol consumption level
for those aected or unaected. Such a decision would be much more dif-
cult to take on the sole basis of the classical control-treatment identifying
condition. Our claim is that recognizing that either Choice Orthogonality or
Weighted Opposite Choices must be fullled, allows the econometrician to
gain substantial insight about the validity of a specic instrument.
5.2 Implications for Weak Instruments
Our analysis has also implications for the weak-strong instrument literature
(Staiger and Stock, 1997). In the literature, a high correlation between the
instrument and the right-hand side endogenous variable is viewed as desirable
as it increases precision of the IV estimator.
Within our framework, a weak instrument is one that emerges from the
implementation of a policy that leaves a large fraction of people unaected,
and which is characterized by a high Noncomplying Odds Ratio.19 As already
19To be precise, the strength of an instrument is usually measured using the correlation
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noted, the Noncomplying Odds Ratio plays no role when Choice Orthogonal-
ity is met. However, when the complying status discloses some degree of
selectivity, the fulllment of the IV identifying condition is itself aected by
the statistical strength of the instrument. So, a weak instrument meets the
moment condition if it generates an Error Term Ratio of the same magni-
tude as the Noncomplying Odds Ratio. Put dierently, weak instruments
can achieve identication only if they imply important imbalances between
compliers and noncompliers unobserved behavior.
This point is dierent than the usual claim that stronger instruments also
reduce the asymptotic IV bias. For this argument to hold, it is necessary to
assume that the numerator of the asymptotic bias (the covariance between
the instrument and the error term) increases less than the denominator (the
covariance between the instrument and the right-hand side endogenous vari-
able) when one moves from one instrument to a stronger one. Indeed, in
a context where the error term is made of unobserved choices (such as in
the current paper), the numerator is not policy invariant and it is incorrect
to claim that stronger instruments automatically reduce the IV asymptotic
bias.20
5.3 Extensions to More General Outcome Models
In economics, many applications of IV estimation have an inherent life-cycle
component and are subject to various forms of dynamics. If choices are made
sequentially and consumption of W depends on the time at which it is re-
alized, or if the demand for W depends on consumption level of S (after
conditioning on i), the consumption level of good W will also depend on
complying status Ci, even after conditioning on i and on all other environ-
mental parameters.21 This creates no additional complication as long as the
econometrician wants to estimate :
between the instrument and the endogenous right-hand side variable. However, it is fair
to assume that a large Noncomplying Odds Ratio is indicative of a weak instrument.
20Belzil and Hansen (2011) illustrates this point within a calibrated life-cycle model of
schooling and earnings.
21One of the most striking examples is found in the returns to education literature. At
any given point in time, the set of individuals aected by an education policy aimed at
increasing schooling will suer a reduction in potential experience, and are likely to have
accumulated less skills.
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Under certain conditions, our result may even be extended to the case
where the econometrician wants to identify the sum of  plus the compound
eect of S on W:22 To remain within a linear IV framework, if one assumes
that the eect of S on W is linearly separable,
Wi = WS(S) +WW (i))
where WS(S) is linear in S; then it is easy to see that either (7) or (10)
must apply to WW (i): However, in such a case, the only dierence with
the stylized example that has been used as the basis of our analysis, is that
Post-Treatment Identity Randomization will no longer be sucient for Choice
Orthogonality. This is because i is no longer sucient to characterize con-
sumption of good W:23
6 Conclusion
The existence of a relationship between IV estimation and sample selection
models has been recognized for more than 10 years. In this paper, we show
that the relationship is actually more profound than what has been noted in
the literature on comparative advantages (and in the literature on the LATE
approach). The fundamental IV identifying assumption is itself the mirror
image of two mutually exlusive sample selection conditions. These conditions
have been derived in a common slope regression model, although they are
also valid in a heterogenous treatment eect model.
The originality of our result lies in its constructive nature. Although the
interpretation of the IV identifying moment condition as behavioral assump-
tions has already been pointed out (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 2000, Keane,
2010), its correspondence with classical sample selection arguments is novel.
Under certain conditions, our approach oers more explicit criteria for eval-
uating the potential performance of an instrument than the usual treatment-
control condition, and for understanding the implicit assumptions. Our ap-
proach also discloses a link between identication and the weak-strong instru-
ment paradigm. At a more methodological level, our nding should reinforce
22This is the case in the dynamic treatment eect literature. See Abbring and Heckman
(2007) for a survey.
23See Belzil and Hansen (2011) for several calibrated examples.
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the idea that IV identifying conditions are disguised functional (distribu-
tional) form assumptions.
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Appendix
An Example with Normality
Consider a simplistic case in which S is binary (S = 1 or S = 0). The
model generating S is given by
Si = I( + i > 0)
where I(:) is the identity function,  is a parameter, and where  is the
heterogeneity term:
For simplicity, assume that "i  N(  Zi; 2"), i  N(0; 1):The correla-
tion between "i and i is denoted : The moment condition is obviously met
is the specic case where  = 0:
We now consider two dierent instruments. The rst one is a consumption
subsidy which increases the utility additively by an strictly positive amount
s. The second instrument is dictatorial and generated when the minimum
consumption level is set to smin = 1:
Consumption Subsidy
To illustrate the moment condition in the case of a subsidy, it is informa-
tive to rewrite the model as
Si = I( + s+ i > 0)
It is easy to see that in such a case,
Pr(Zi = 1; Ci = 1) = ( )  (    s) (13)
where (:) denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function,
and that
Pr(Zi = 1; Ci = 0) = 1  ( ) + (    s) (14)
The non-complying odds ratio is therefore
	0;1 =
1  ( ) + (    s)
( )  (    s)
Using the properties of the bivariate Normal distribution, we obtain the
following:
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E("i j Zi = 1; Ci = 1) = + "f ( s  )  ( )
( )  (    s)g (15)
and
E("i j Zi = 1; Ci = 0) =
(1  ( ))
1  ( ) + (    s)  (+ "
( )
1  ( )) +
(    s)
1  ( ) + (    s)  (  "
(    s)
(    s)) (16)
So, the moment condition is either veried when (15) = (16) or when the
ratio of (15) over (16) is equal to 1 ( )+(  s)
( ) (  s) :
Minimum Consumption
When the minimum consumption level is set to smin = 1; we obtain
Pr(Zi = 1; Ci = 1) = ( ) (17)
and
Pr(Zi = 1; Ci = 0) = 1  ( ) (18)
The non-complying odds ratio is therefore
	0;1 =
1  ( )
( )
Because consumption is monotonic in i; the intervention splits the pop-
ulation into two sub-populations which may be characterized in terms of a
single reservation value ( ), and it is clear that a minimum consumption
intervention cannot fulll Choice Orthogonality. To see this, we just note
that
E("i j Zi = 1; Ci = 1) =   " ( )
( ) (19)
and
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E("i j Zi = 1; Ci = 0) = + " ( )
1  ( ) (20)
However, Weighted Opposite Choices is veried if
  " ( )( )
+ "
( )
1 ( )
=
1  ( )
( ) (21)
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